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CONFLICTS IN PROPERTY
Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Property is conflict.  More precisely, property exists to govern
conflicts.  Property conflicts come in two forms: conflicts of individuals
and conflicts of interest.  While the first form has received most scholarly
attention, the second has quietly come to dominate the development of
property law.  This Article brings conflicts of interest to the fore.
Conflicts of individuals have long been the paradigmatic property
struggle.  We both want to fish; there are not enough fish.  I got there first;
so I argue the fish are mine.  Based on a rule of “first possession” for
governing such interpersonal conflicts, the state may give me a property
right such that I can exclude you from the fish.  “Trespass” is another such
rule.  I own Blackacre; you own Whiteacre.  The state allows us each to
exclude the other.  If I want to cross your Whiteacre, I must acquire the
right from you.  According to this conception, the drama of property
consists in furthering a productive struggle between autonomous excluders,
with each individual cloaked in the Blackstonian armor of “sole and
despotic dominion.”
From this perspective, conflict of interests are never good.  They
represent war within rather than among individuals.  Individuals at war with
themselves are disabled from acting forthrightly and decisively as market
transactors.  So, when conflicts of interest do arise, they should be
eliminated.  People can avoid them in two ways.  They can redefine the
underlying relationship so there is no longer a conflict, or they can disclose
the conflict so there is no longer a betrayal of trust.  Either escape or
disclosure restores the parties to their autonomous status as formally-equal,
unconflicted parties, all contributing in their own self-interested ways to
creation of well-functioning markets.  But this is an impoverished view of
property.
Focusing on productive competition overlooks the equal value of
productive cooperation.   Large parts of property law encourage productive
cooperation by helping people manage conflicts of interest rather than
avoid them.  I want to fish from our lake and I want us to leave fish for our
children; I want to irrigate our land and I want your help in harvesting.
Often, an individual or a subset of owners decide how a group’s resource
will be used—consumed and invested, managed, and alienated.  Disclosure
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cannot effectively address difficulties of conflicts of interests that inhere in
such cases, and escape means giving up the advantages of cooperation
through property.
Property law knows better than these two disappointing strategies.
A thick and rather sophisticated set of property rules encourage decision-
makers not only to satisfy their self-interest, but also to take into account
the interests of their fellow group members.  The state addresses these intra-
personal conflicts through laws of co-ownership, partnership, or marital
property, for example.  According to this conception, the drama of property
consists in creating governance institutions that manage conflicts of interest
arising within those individuals who control, use, or transfer group
resources.
A conflict of interest can be more sharply defined.  We can say that
someone has a conflict of interest if, and only if, that individual (1) is in a
relationship with another requiring the exercise of judgment on the other’s
behalf, and (2) has some interest tending to interfere with the proper
exercise of judgment in that relationship.1  For the purposes of this
definition,“the relationship required must . . .  involve one person trusting
(or, at least, being entitled to trust) another to do something for
her—exercising judgment in her service.”2  Managing conflict stands for
any “partial realigning of interests, not enough to eliminate the conflict of
interest but enough to make it seem likely that benefits will more than repay
the costs.”3
This concern for “partial realigning of interests” can help bring
large areas of property law into focus.  While property law encourages
individuals to compete productively, it also encourages them to govern
group resources so as to create the economic and social gains possible from
cooperation.  In this conception, conflicts of interest play a subtle role, to
be avoided in some circumstances, managed in others.  A well-governed
property system fosters both productive competition and productive
cooperation, autonomy and interdependence, exclusion and governance,
avoidance and management of conflicts of interest.
In this Article, we situate the management of conflicts of interests
at the core of property governance.  Part II demonstrates how property
governance solves conflicts of interest for individuals acting in their own
self-interest and as decision-makers over group resources in which they
have a stake.  We tease out the governance mechanisms by which property
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law helps people manage these conflicts, create interdependence, and
achieve the gains possible from productive cooperation.  More particularly,
we show how property governance serves to (a) internalize, (b)
democratize, and (c) de-escalate conflicts–three mechanisms that allow
people to engage safely in productive cooperation, rather than always
falling back to competition.
Part III explains the patterns that emerge from the heterogeneous
solutions that property law provides to manage conflicts of interests.  First,
we show that the ratio of economic to social benefits in a particular group
resource setting best predicts and best justifies the property form chosen for
managing conflicts.  Second, we show that when “economic”
considerations predominate in managing a group resource, the property
form typically uses formal and foreground mechanisms for “partial
realigning of interests,” while property forms usually use informal and
background safety net rules at the “social” end of the group resource
spectrum.  Third, and finally, we show that substantive rules for managing
conflicts also ranges predictably along the economic to social spectrum,
with contribution-based allocation of rights and responsibilities at one end,
and egalitarian substantive rules at the other.  The conflicts of interest prism
helps make sense of an otherwise bewildering array of discrete property
doctrines.  
II.  PROPERTY CONFLICTS 
A.  Conflicts and Conflicts of Interests
Currently, most property scholars seem to have little interest in
conflicts of interest and their regulation.  This is not to say that conflicts are
alien to property.  Quite the contrary.  In the conventional view, conflicts
pervade property.  But these are conflicts of a very different type.  The
conventional narrative of property is one of conflicts between autonomous
excluders.4
The Blackstonian tradition, which conceptualizes property as sole
and despotic dominion,5 invites and supports this analysis.  While no one
seriously thinks anymore that property always and necessarily entails
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unqualified dominion,6 the conception of “property as exclusion” is still
perceived as the regulative idea of private property.7  If indeed property is
about exclusion, as scholars such as Thomas Merrill  and James Penner
have recently argued,8 then the doctrinal home for property conflicts is
trespass law.  As the paradigmatic doctrine for regulating conflicts between
strangers, trespass law seems to have very little to do with conflicts of
interest and their regulation.  Because conflicts of interest require a
background relationship in which one is entitled to trust another person,
this concept seems indeed to be irrelevant to the main actors in property
dramas—excluders with no strong entitlement to each other’s trust.
We do not deny that property is also about exclusion: conflicts
giving rise to trespass law are part of the landscape of property.  But the
traditional discourse, with its focus on exclusion, independence, and
competition, overstates its case.  Exclusion can exhaust the field of property
only if one, somewhat arbitrarily, sets aside large parts of what is property
law, at least according to the conventional understanding found in the case
law, Restatements, and academic commentary.  Property institutions
provide structures for various types of interpersonal relationships—from
strangers and market transactors through landlords and tenants, members
of a local community, neighbors, co-owners and partners, to the intimate
relationship among family members.9  Accordingly, people experience
property as both a locus of competition and an arena for cooperation.  In
other words, governance—the ongoing management of cooperative
relationships— typifies property at least as much as exclusion does.  For
this reason, the concept of conflict of interest and the discussion of
strategies for regulating conflicts of interest can highlight important aspects
of property law.
B.  Avoiding and Managing Conflicts of Interests
Property law is filled with diverse mechanisms for dealing with
conflicts of interest.  Some of these rules allow people to avoid conflicts of
interest; others—of particular interest to this Article—help them manage
conflicts of interest.
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Because of our societal commitment to exit, property law does, and
indeed should, allow people to avoid, rather than manage, conflicts of
interest.  Exit is a bedrock liberal value.  It stands for the right to withdraw
or refuse to engage; it is the ability to dissociate, to cut oneself out of a
relationship with other persons.10  The commitment of (liberal) law to
exit—to the idea of open boundaries that enable geographical, social,
familial, and political mobility—“enhances the capacity for a self-directed
life, including the capacity to form, revise, and pursue our ends.”11  Thus,
for example, in the co-ownership and marital property areas, partition and
divorce are simple mechanisms for escaping conflicts of interest.  We value
exit so highly that mechanisms such as partition or divorce are essentially
unwaivable.12  These mechanisms recast resource struggles from conflicts
of interest into conflicts of individuals, shifting people from productive
cooperation to productive competition. 
Avoidance has been relatively better documented over the years and
proves less germane to the more theoretically-promising issues involved in
managing conflicts of interest.  So, instead of focusing first on partition or
divorce, we look at how property law facilitates cooperation for people who
do want to work together.  The challenge of what we call liberal commons
institutions, such as co-ownership and marriage, is to facilitate people’s
ability to gain the economic and social benefits of productive cooperation
in the difficult context where the possibility of exit—of escaping the
conflicts of interests inherent in property governance—threatens the very
possibility of trust and reciprocity.13
To face this challenge, each of these property institutions contains
rules for managing conflicts of interests in three spheres of decision-making
that may affect the collective interest in a resource: decisions about
consumption and investment; about management; and about allocation.
Each of these spheres can be helpfully analyzed as a means for “partial
realigning of interests.”  Given the multiplicity and apparent diversity of
property governance rules in each of these spheres, however, even a bare
catalogue of these rules would be a daunting and unproductive task.  So, we
do not attempt a full restatement.  Instead, our task here is to highlight some
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patterns that emerge across a wide set of these institutions and show how
property law provides a general set of solutions to conflicts of interest.
C.  Internalization, Democratization, and De-escalation
Canvassing property law as a whole, we uncover three primary tools
that property law has developed to manage conflicts of interest:
internalizing externalities; democratizing management; and de-escalating
transactions.  Internalization, democratization and de-escalation solutions
roughly correspond to the conflict of interest dilemmas that arise from
consumption and investment, collective governance and decision-making,
and policing exit from and entry into group property resources.
(1) Internalization.  Consider cases where individuals want to
transform the group resource, either by taking something out for their
individual benefit, or investing something that may benefit the others.  A
co-owner wants to chop down trees on co-owned land, or to invest in
machinery for the common enterprise; people want to invest in businesses
but are worried that their associates might impose upon them excessive
liabilities.  In these instances, the individual’s self-interest may diverge
from their interest in their co-owners’ or partners’ welfare.  Property law
offers a range of doctrines for managing these conflicts.
One common approach to conflicts of interest regarding
consumption of and investment in group resources is to interpose
governance rules that partially or wholly concentrate the costs or benefits
of such a decision on the individual.  For example, the co-owner may have
to account to the community for the value of trees chopped, and may be
able to keep at least some of the gains attributable to his or her individual
investment in the commons resource.14  Likewise, a variety of
property-holding forms—such as the limited liability company, limited
liability partnership, and the limited liability limited partnership—offer
mechanisms allowing members to participate in management and control
but also constrain the liability of members for the actions of their
co-adventurers.15  By internalizing the consequences of individual decision-
[Draft May 18, 2004]                     CONFLICTS IN PROPERTY 7
16 See respectively, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SERVITUDES Ch.6 Pt. D (2000);
J. Thomas Oldham, Management of the Community Estate During an Intact Marriage, 56
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 112-115 (1993) (discussing representational management of
community property arising by operation of law). 
17 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, Condominium and Cooperative Housing:
Transactional Efficiency, Tax Subsidies, and Tenure Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 25 (1991).
18 See Dagan & Heller, supra note 12, at 598-601.
making, property governance rules regarding consumption and investment
help people take autonomous decisions regarding the group resource while
preserving productive cooperation.  Internalization proves to be a powerful
path to managing conflicts of interest.
(2) Democratization.  Sometimes a community may decide to
reserve certain types of management decisions to the group as a whole,
rather than allowing individual autonomy, say for decisions that have larger
or more enduring consequences for the resource.  For example, a unit owner
may want the condominium to put a new roof on the building, or a spouse
may want to mortgage the family house.  Again, the individual owner’s
self-interest and their regard for the community’s interest may diverge.
To address conflicts of interest that go to fundamental management
decisions, property law often limits the scope of action open to individuals
and shifts decision-making to a sphere of democratic self-governance.
Condo owners or spouses may be disabled from acting directly.  Property
law instead interposes governance institutions that empower owners to act
indirectly, such as through an elected condo board or through joint
agreement in a community property.16  There are many such conflict-
transforming institutions that align individual and group goals by
aggregating individual preferences or objectives.  These range from
democratic participatory institutions, like a simple majority rule, to
representative or hierarchical mechanisms, such as a condo board in a
common interest community or a board of directors in a close corporation.17
(3) De-escalation.  In many cases, people just don’t want to manage
conflicts.  They want to avoid them, leave a bad relationship, and get on
with their lives (or opt for exclusion and autonomy).  Property law offers
a range of governance tools for de-escalating the conflicts of interests that
arise as people exit from and enter into cooperative property institutions.
For example, rules like rights of first refusal, cooling off periods, and exit
taxes are intended to ease conflicts of interest by allowing the individual to
leave, but to do so in a way that is community-enhancing.18  Similarly, rules
regarding who can enter a community, and the terms of entry, help to de-
escalate conflicts.  By exercising some control over who enters, existing
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(continued...)
members can find new members who are relatively more likely to take a
community-enhancing approach to the conflicts of interest that may arise.19
The three approaches property law employs in managing conflicts
of interest—internalizing externalities around individual use and investment
decisions, democratizing a set of management decisions by shifting
authority from individual to group control, and de-escalating tensions
around entry and exit—are ideal types, which in turn cover vastly divergent
rules.  Thus, for example, internalizing consumption and investment
decisions by owners can be achieved by limiting access to the joint resource
or by an opposing rule that allows access but then provides some
accounting mechanism for costs and benefits.  Democratizing management,
in turn, can be accomplished by an elected hierarchical management; but
it can also be reached using a more participatory set of procedures.  And de-
escalating tensions can be achieved by relying on exit through sales into the
market, or though procedures regulating entry and exit.  A restatement of
the rules dealing with consumption and investment, management, and
alienation across the wide range of liberal commons institutions would need
to include rules of all of these types and many more.
III.  A TYPOLOGY OF CONFLICTS IN PROPERTY 
In this part, we show that the multiplicity of property solutions to
conflicts of interest is neither chaotic nor unprincipled.  Rather, these
solutions can be explained by reference to the divergent “characters” of the
underlying property institutions.  Property law supports a wide range of
institutions that facilitate the economic and social gains possible from
cooperation.  Some of these institutions, such as a close corporation, are
mostly about economic gains—securing efficiencies of economies of scale
and risk-spreading—with social benefits being merely a (sometimes
pleasant) side-effect.  Other institutions, such as marriage, are more about
the intrinsic good of being part of a plural subject, where the raison d’être
of the property institution refers more to one’s identity and interpersonal
relationships, while the attendant economic benefits are perceived as
helpful by-products, rather than the primary basis for cooperation.20  The
underlying character of the divergent relationships proves to be the key to
explaining property law’s devices for managing conflict of interest.21
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this reason, it should not be surprising that the prevalent institutional form of nonprofit
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A.  Conflict Management and the Character of Property Institutions
We begin by stating our most general proposition regarding how
property law partially realigns stakeholders’ interests: management rules
track the economic or social character of the underlying property
institution.  Our distinction between economic and social is not about
whether the activity is economic or not, in some absolute sense.  After all,
we are dealing with property institutions that always have economic
implications, especially at the “end-game” when relationships break down,
and people move from managing conflicts of interest to escaping them.
Thus, even in the marital property context, end-game rules concern
themselves primarily with economic allocation rather than facilitating
social interactions.  But colorful dramas at the end-game of property
institutions should not obscure the daily—but ultimately more
germane—mid-game life of these property institutions.22  Hence, we focus
on the role of property institutions as fora for various types of interpersonal
relationships.  Our reference to the “character” of the property institution
seeks to capture its predominant or underlying purpose.
The differing purposes of property institutions are all-important, as
they should guide the rules which are needed to support the mid-game,
interpersonal relationship which the underlying property institution aims to
facilitate.  Even rules about the end-game (partition or divorce) can be
analyzed from this perspective because they can, and should, serve as
background norms to channel and shape the expectations of participants in
the varying property institutions at stake.23  In other words, mid-game
purposes dealing with the daily and the mundane inform end-game rules
dealing with failures and pathologies.  Rather than focusing analysis on the
failures of these property institutions, we instead look at the core period of
success, the period that provides stakeholders their predominant motivation
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for entering the relationship, and that structures the rules for conflicts
management.
In many contexts the economic and social mid-game purposes tend
to reinforce one another because interpersonal capital facilitates trust,
which, in turn, gives rise to economic success, and economic success tends
to strengthen trust and mutual responsibility.24  But at times economic
success and social cohesion push in different directions.  While neither
front can be wholly abandoned—because either total economic failure or
the collapse of social cohesion will effectively end cooperative resource
management—different property institutions (from close corporations to
families) allow differing emphases for economic success and social
cohesion.  More precisely, for property institutions at the economic end of
the spectrum, ideal-typic parties to conflicts of interests are (implicitly)
conceptualized by law as “absentee investors”; by contrast, at the social
end, they are “active participants.”
As property institutions approach the economic pole of the
spectrum, the more likely it is that stakeholders will be treated as “absentee
investors,” interested in maximizing profit while minimizing their daily
involvement.25  This implicit conceptualization affects the nature of the
legal rules regulating potential conflicts of interest in all three decisional
spheres.  Concerns about potential conflicts of interests regarding the
sphere of individual consumption and investment decisions—concerns
about internalizing costs of over-use and under-investment—will be solved
by limiting access to the resource.  Potential conflicts of interests in the
sphere of democratizing management decisions, in turn, are likely to be
handled by setting hierarchical and formal procedures.  And in the third
sphere of transactions, de-escalating conflicts, there will be little internal
control because market transactions provide ample policing against the
external effects of stakeholders’ decisions.
By contrast, the closer a property institution is to the social pole, the
more stakeholders are increasingly understood—by themselves and by
others—as active participants in a joint endeavor, members in a purposive
community.  Thus, concerns about over-use and under-investment can no
longer be solved by limiting access.  The law must set what we call a sphere
of “individual dominion”—a realm of decisions regarding consumption and
investment that a member can take on her own.  In this realm, the potential
abuses of over-use and under-investment must be regulated head-on by
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setting accounting rules that protect against such opportunism.
Furthermore, when we get to the sphere of more fundamental managerial
decisions, hierarchies become—at least in liberal legal
environments—increasingly unacceptable.  Where the economic aspect is
tangential to the role of the joint resource as a focal point of a community’s
self-identification, participatory procedures are called for.  The closer a
property institution is to the social pole, the higher the emphasis is on
voice; the more likely, in other words, that we will find a republican
governance  regime in which joint management is not only a means to the
end of maximizing yield, but also a forum and a medium of community-
building.  Finally, in these types of property institutions the market does not
provide sufficient protection against external effects in stakeholders’
transactional decisions.  The more social it is, the higher are the risks of
opportunistic exit and entry.  Thus, the more social it is, the more collective
control we see over exit and entry.  Supporting predominantly social
property institutions requires legal mechanisms aimed at policing
opportunistic exit and preempting opportunistic entrants.26
As these sketches suggest, the economic/social spectrum informs
the animating values that drive law’s solutions to conflict of interest
problems.  The discussion below develops the argument by showing that
this spectrum helps explain, and indeed justify, many of the rules
addressing problems of conflict of interest in consumption and investment,
management, and alienation of group resources.   In other words, situating
legal rules in context transforms seeming chaos into a coherent legal
landscape.
B.  Addressing Consumption and Investment
Legal rules addressing conflicts of interests in the context of
consumption and investment by individual stakeholders take three main
forms: limiting access to the joint resource; providing for an accounting
based on the relative contribution of the individual parties; and prescribing
a regime which collectivizes their individual inputs and outputs.  Each form
is based on a specific understanding of the parties’ relationship and will be
ill-suited if transplanted in an alien context. 
As a corner case, beyond the direct scope of the Article, consider a
shareholder in a publicly held corporation.  Such a shareholder is precluded
from having access to the assets of the firm: she can neither consume these
resources nor make any (individual) decisions regarding investment in
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29 See STEPHEN BUCKLE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF PROPERTY 149-52
(1991) (discussing Lockean justification for property rights as reward for productive labor);
STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 255-67, 285-87 (1990) (pointing to the
centrality of desert for labor to the justification for private property.)
30 See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 12, at 126-32.
31 See, e.g., ISRAEL LAND LAW § 33, 1959, 23 L.S.I. 288, (1968-1969).
32 See  § 748 BGB, translated in THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE 122 (Ian S. Forrester et
al., trans., 1975); ISRAEL LAND LAW § 32.
33 See, e.g., 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.13, at 52-54 (A. James Casner ed.,
1952).
them.27  Other stakeholders in property institutions do have some access to
the joint resource, but the scope of their rights to consume and invest, and,
even more importantly, the legal consequences following such individual
acts vary significantly.28  More specifically, as we shift from economic to
social, we are shifting away from simple stakeholding and towards a more
robust set of rights and responsibilities.  In between the absentee owner and
the spouse, we can find cases of active members in “Lockean communities”
– communities committed to awarding rights or wages to those who
contribute to the collectivity by engaging in purposeful value-creating
activities.29  In such cases, contribution-based accounting rules safeguard
the community against abuses of the decision-making power in
consumption and investment decisions.  Then, at the furthest social end of
the spectrum—marital property—not only is the realm of individual
involvement the widest, but it is also the most egalitarian.30
The law of co-ownership provides a nice example of a Lockean
community.  Internalization typifies the regulation of consumption and
investment decisions in both common law and civil law traditions.  This
mechanism is firmly established in the Continental tradition with clear rules
prescribing liability for the fair market value for use31 and an entitlement
to pro rata contribution for investment in preservation of the common
resource.32  The rules of the common law fall short in some respects:
liability for use is contingent upon the ouster of the absentee commoner;33
and the entitlement to contribution is in most cases deferred up until the
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time of partition.34  These differences are not insignificant.35  But for our
purposes the similarities are much more important.  Both traditions allow
individual commoners access to the common resource for the purposes of
consumption and investment.  Both therefore need to set internalization
rules that manage the resulting conflicts of interests which come about from
the divergence between the self-interest of the individual commoner and
the collective interest.  And—our main point here—these internalization
rules assume a Lockean baseline, which is the premise of law’s accounting
procedure, calculating individual inputs and outputs. 
Compare this scheme with the law of marital property.  As a liberal
commons institution, marital property law is also concerned with possible
conflicts of interests between spouses in their investment decisions in the
marital estate.  But while the rhetoric of individual contribution still
pervades marital property law, its actual doctrine has very little to do with
the Lockean desert-for-labor principle.36  Instead of an accounting
mechanism of individual inputs and outputs, the most basic norm of marital
property law is equal division upon divorce.37  This norm takes different
forms in different jurisdictions—a bright line rule, a presumption, or a
“starting point” which applies at the very least with regard to the family
home.38  What is important for our purposes here is again the common
denominator of these different doctrines: their rejection of the  accounting
logic of Lockean baselines.  A rule of equal property division on divorce
discourages keeping an accounting of individual investments in and returns
from the marital relationship.  Contrariwise, equal division makes it easier
for spouses to engage in sharing behavior that typifies marriage—investing
in relationship-specific goods, specializing, and making individual
sacrifices for the overall good of the marital community.  Spreading the
benefits and the risks of this kind of behavior equally between the parties
transforms personal sacrifice into joint endeavor.39  
The same egalitarian premise, but with a twist, applies to potential
conflicts of interest in the consumption of marital assets.  The basic rule
follows the fundamental premise of sharing with no accounting by allowing
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normal consumption by a spouse even if it is not equal to the consumption
of the other spouse.  But in order to protect a daily routine of no
accounting, marital property law also anticipates the pathological cases and
protects each individual spouse from abusive consumption choices by the
other.  Hence, it also includes an ancillary rule which provides remedies for
extremely irresponsible or overly self-interested consumption decisions,
such as in cases of gambling, drinking, and drug-use, which tend both to
benefit one spouse disproportionately and to threaten the integrity of the
marital estate.40
C.  Regulating Collective Decision-Making
Paralleling the shift in underlying values guiding conflicts
management, we also see a shift in the style of decision-making, moving
from formal and hierarchical to informal and participatory.  Predominantly
economic property institutions are usually highly formal and hierarchical.
Here, the regulation of conflicts of interests in the context of management
decisions is addressed by ex ante rules setting governing bodies, allocating
powers among them, and prescribing procedures for their routinized
operation.41  These rules are typically foreground rules: rules that
stakeholders and legal players alike expect to be deployed in the daily life
of the property institution at stake (and not only during the end-game,
which is inevitably legal).
By contrast, predominantly social property institutions are highly
informal and participatory.  Parties to neighborly relationships often find
formalistic decision-making and resort to law to be the beginning of the
end.42  So, if law is to facilitate such property institutions, it needs to act in
softer ways by setting more participatory and looser procedures.
Governance in these contexts is understood not only instrumentally, but
also as a means to intensify the parties’ inter-personal relations.  Hence,
republican participatory governance substitutes for the top-down
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governance of purely economic property institutions.43  Furthermore,
instead of foreground rules, law typically employs background regimes for
consensual decision-making.  Thus, a majority rule can provide a safety net
against the potential abuse of holdout.44  Similarly, incentives for third-
parties can help police the community’s governance rules indirectly by
voiding decisions regarding the common resource that were not reached by
the appropriate majority or through the appropriate procedures.45
At first sight, it may seem that the effect of the character of property
institutions on law’s internalization mechanisms is a matter of substance,
whereas its effect on law’s democratization mechanisms is a matter of
form.  While the form/substance dichotomy maps to a large extent to these
different mechanisms, it would be incorrect to ignore the ways in which
management rules (democratization) implicate substance and consumption
and investment rules (internalization) implicate form.  Thus, the norm of
equality that typifies the social end of our spectrum informs not only
substantive rights of spouses, but also their voting rights.  For instance,
voice is not related to contribution in marriage.46  On the other hand, not
only law’s democratization mechanisms for regulating potential conflicts
of interests in management decisions function as safety nets in the
background of the parties’ relationships.  Law’s accounting rules governing
consumption and investment decisions also function in a similar way,
affecting the parties’ behavior and expectations and protecting them from
abuse, rather than regulating their daily life.47
But our focus in this section is on democratization: the differing
ways in which property law addresses conflicts of interest that go to
fundamental management decisions by setting procedures of collective
management.  The law of common interest communities provides a rich
example for a formal and hierarchical management regime which typifies
predominantly economic property institutions.  A common interest
community has the powers to manage the common property and administer
the servitude regime of a real-estate development or neighborhood.48  It can
raise funds (by way of assessment of fees); manage, acquire, and improve
common property; adopt rules governing use of property; and set
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procedures to encourage compliance and deter violations.49  A common
interest community is managed by an association, which is in turn governed
for most purposes by a representative government: a board elected by its
members.  The board is entitled “to exercise all powers of the community
except those reserved to the members,” and members have “the right to
vote in elections for the board of directors and on other matters properly
presented to [them], to attend and participate in meetings of the members,
and to stand for election to the board of directors.  Except when the board
properly meets in executive session, [members] are [also] entitled to attend
meetings of the board of directors and to a reasonable opportunity to
present their views to the board.”50
Compare this formal and hierarchical management structure to the
informal and participatory regime applicable in predominantly social
property.  One example comes from the governance of commons property
in the Continental tradition, in which the law prescribes only a basic norm
of majority rule, accompanied by open-ended rules of disclosure,
consultation, and fair hearing.51  Another example comes from the rules
community property law prescribes for the governance of marital
property.52  Transactions in the marital estate that involve substantial
amounts of money (such as a community real estate or business) or
resources that reflect the group-identity of the marital community and the
personhood of its members (again, the marital residence, but also its
contents) require joinder.53  Joinder is desirable in these context to ensure
that decisions indeed reflect the communal goods; to manage, in other
words, the potential conflict between the interest of each individual spouse
and the collective good.  The joinder rule is a background rule.  It neither
prescribes any specific governance procedure, nor does it require judicial
intervention within a functioning marriage.  Rather, in most cases where
joinder is required, banks and other third-parties are recruited to police
conflicts of interest.  Where such third parties realize that effective
transactions require joinder, they are likely to require joinder before they
enter into the pertinent transaction with a spouse, thus indirectly preventing
self-serving violations of the community.54 
[Draft May 18, 2004]                     CONFLICTS IN PROPERTY 17
54(...continued)
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 218 (1998).
55 In these institutions, the presumption in favor of free alienability can even extend
to sales of controlling blocks of shares, which may allow large blockholders to capture
arguably disproportionate premia for the sale of control.  Cf. Frank E. Easterbrook & Daniel
Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 715-19 (1982) (arguing in
favor of “market rule”).
56 For example, Israel law sets a time limitation of five years for agreements
restraining alienation, and prescribes that the time limit on agreements restraining partition
is left to the discretion of the court—after three years, the court may order partition despite
the agreement if the court deems it just to do so is.  See ISRAEL LAND LAW §§ 34(b), 37(b).
57 Covenant marriage, first adopted in Louisiana, is one well-known example of
waiting periods for divorce.  LA. CIV. CODE ANN. 9:272-75.1, 307-09 (West 2000).  To the
extent that covenant marriage does not allow immediate exit from emotionally or
psychologically abusive relationships, it is obviously unsupportable.  See Jeanne Louise
Carriere, “It's Deja Vu All Over Again”: The Covenant Marriage Act in Popular Cultural
Perception and Legal Reality, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1701 (1998).
D.  Policing Exit and Entry
Decisions to sell (or buy) a share in the common resource can affect
the well-being of the community and thus may give rise to worries of
conflicts of interest.  Yet, where predominantly economic property
institutions are at issue, the pricing mechanism of the market sufficiently
polices against abuse, so that there is no further need for a more fine-tuned
de-escalating mechanism.  This is indeed the law in the limiting case of our
inquiry: publicly-held corporations.55  As we move towards the pole of
predominantly social institutions, things become more complicated.  With
respect to these property institutions, social cohesion is an increasingly
important part of the value of the common resource, both to the remaining
commoners and to the potential entrants.  Here, to protect the community
from opportunistic exit, we find rules aimed at ameliorating such potential
conflicts of interest.
With some liberal commons institutions, these mechanisms take the
form of moderate alienation restraints that protect cooperation values.
Thus, one way to manage conflicts of interests in property institutions is by
prescribing cooling off periods.  This technique applies in many co-
ownership settings56 and was recently introduced (albeit in a controversial
fashion) in some states that provide for waiting periods before divorce.57
Cooling off periods can help ameliorate the damaging domino effect of
defection in consumption and investment decisions.  Such “grace periods”
are, at times, enough to  support the parties’ continued trust and
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cooperation even if fully “rational” parties would behave cooperatively
only in indefinite games.58 
Similarly, exit taxes that monetize the destructive effects of exit (the
costs of recruitment and socialization of a replacement commoner) and are
properly attuned to deter opportunistic departure,59 can also serve as
legitimate background rules that create more safety nets for community to
work.  The shift in marital property law from title theory through
contribution theory to the increasingly prevalent norm of equal division
upon divorce can be analyzed as an important example for such a virtuous
exit tax.
Finally, de-escalating the conflicts of interests generated by exit
decisions and policing against opportunistic entry may require entry-control
mechanisms, such as a right of first refusal.  This technique—applied
notably in the contexts of condominiums and cooperatives60—allows the
group some degree of control over the identity of future transferees of the
current commoners by screening non-cooperative entrants.  By doing so,
they also prevent exploitation by exiters who may be motivated either by
spite or by the possibility of side payments from remaining members to
ensure cooperative replacements. 
These three techniques—cooling off periods, exit taxes, and entry-
control—constitute a rich repertoire of de-escalating strategies for
addressing the potential conflicts of interests generated by a member’s
decision to exit.  But the context of exit raises another potential conflict of
interest—a  mirror-image of the one we thus far discussed, namely the fear
that the exiter (or any individual commoner, for that matter) will be
opportunistically diluted by other members of the community (the
majority).  Here again, insofar as predominantly economic property
institutions are concerned, the pricing mechanism of the market provides
a sufficient policing mechanism so that there is no need for any further de-
escalating technique.  But as we move to the more social property
institutions, the market may not be enough.  In those contexts, sale may not
sufficiently protect against opportunistic dilution, because it can be
expected to under-value the pro rata ownership share of the exiter.  This
undervaluation is increasingly likely and significant as the social benefits
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of cooperation, and the role of participatory management, become more
central to the commons resource, such as in the contexts of co-ownership
and partnership.  Because allowing a departing individual to break up the
property institution is, in these contexts, the only way of policing against
such an opportunism and preserving people’s right to exit, the doctrine
governing these contexts provides an inalienable right (which can be
limited only temporarily) to partition or dissolution.61 
IV.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
Once released from the straightjacket of exclusion theory, property
law provides a fertile ground for inquiries about conflicts of interest.
Because property is just as much about cooperation as it is about
competition—because property law regulates governance at least as much
as it addresses exclusion—property scholars need to begin thinking about
management mechanisms for conflicts of interest.  Managing conflicts is
the inevitable price of cooperative property institutions.  To be sure,
avoiding and escaping conflicts of interests are, and should be, important
legal responses.  Nothing in what we have claimed in this Article argues
against the centrality of the fee simple absolute or against the availability
of exit—by sale and, where needed, even by dissolution.  However, in an
increasingly interdependent world, people frequently want or need to work
together, but worry that others may take advantage of them.  Property
governance, properly understood as a set of techniques for managing
conflicts of interests in liberal commons institutions, is law’s response to
this challenge.
Property law employs three types of techniques for the partial
realignment of stakeholders’ interests: internalization, democratization, and
de-escalation.  And the specific form of each technique is, by and large,
fine-tuned to the character of the pertinent property institution.  Table 1,
below, reorganizes and summarizes our claims on this matter.  Of course,
as we mentioned throughout, economic and social aspects inhere in every
property governance form, so what we present as a dichotomy exists as a
spectrum.  Also, there is not a necessary link between each mode of
managing conflicts in property and each sphere of property governance.
These associations are typical, but not inevitable.
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TABLE 1: Managing Conflicts of Interest in Property
We hope to have taken here the first steps towards a better
understanding of the ways in which  property law deals with—avoids and
escapes, but also manages—conflicts of interests.  As a by-product, this
inquiry may have also yielded a lesson regarding the concept of conflicts
of interest itself, which may have applications beyond the context of
property.  We therefore conclude with the following thought, which we
hope to develop in our future work.
Maybe the spectrum of solutions we have identified is not just a
matter of varying manifestations of conflicts of interest, but is rather
explained by the very different nature of such conflicts as one moves along
the economic/social spectrum.  By including different relationships
between the active individual and the interest which is threatened by a
conflict of interest, our spectrum reveals very different understandings (or
conceptions) of the problem of conflicts of interest itself.62
On the one pole – the predominantly economic – conflicts are
between the well-defined interest of an individual qua individual and the
expectation that the individual will represent the collective interest the
person is assigned to represent.  Limiting access (or a Lockean accounting),
hierarchical and formal governance, and market-based de-escalation
devices are fine solutions to problems of conflicts of interests understood
within the paradigm of an I/We dichotomy.  
As one moves along the spectrum towards the more social contexts,
this conceptualization of the problem of conflict of interest is increasingly
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problematic because its implicit dichotomy between I and you (or we), and
mine and yours (or ours), becomes increasingly reductive.  At the social
pole of the spectrum (e.g., marriage) conflicts of interest are, to an extent,
internal to the individual actor, because the group is also part of the actor’s
own self-understanding.63  As the plural identity of the collective group
becomes a more constitutive element of each individual’s self-
understanding, applying predominantly economic understandings of, and
responses to, conflicts of interest threatens to undermine rather than
advance the good that the property institution is designed to encourage.
Law’s tools for internalization, democratization and de-escalation in these
contexts – equal sharing, informal and participatory governance, and
collective mechanisms for regulating exit and entry – appropriately mirror
their social character.
More generally, property law’s varied solutions to conflicts of
interest respond to these underlying differences in the nature of the group
resource dilemma.  Perfectly plausible solutions to conflicts of interests in
predominantly economic property institutions are increasingly ill-suited to
more social property institutions (and vice versa).  The inventory of
management techniques employed by property law may seem at first sight
confusing, almost chaotic.  The conflicts of interest lens opens a new and
challenging perspective that brings focus to this doctrinal muddle.
